Note: The results are based on olS (Squares ordinary least) regressions in the hourly wage of working time protocol on hourly work productivity in different sectors. Regressions include modelling for the campaign year and interactions between log productivity and wage coordination lures and collective agreements. Low, medium and high tariff coverage ends with averages for the bottom third, the middle third and the top third for the distribution of coverage rates in the sample. The guidelines of high-level organizations set standards or objectives that should be met in negotiations at lower levels. They are present in several countries, but are generally only binding in countries where trade unions or employers` organisations are relatively strong and centralized (in the Nordic countries and, to a lesser extent, in France and Italy). While strict conditions for the application of opening clauses contribute to the organisation of the decentralisation process, they can also significantly reduce their role. Where there are opening clauses, opt-outs are generally used by large companies that are not necessarily the poorest. Small businesses are often unable to benefit from opt-out waivers and clauses due to the lack of capacity or representation of workers. In a potentially extreme scenario, but not entirely unlikely, opt-outs with very strict conditions can become an anti-competitive instrument: large companies could first negotiate relatively generous terms in sectoral agreements, and then decide to improve the conditions in their favour, so that competitors must bear the main burden of the generous terms they negotiate.28 Studies on the differences between wage movements in unionized and non-unionised sectors. , particularly in the United States, three other effects of the extension of collective bargaining have been generated.
One of them is a single effect and effect: the introduction of collective bargaining has increased the wages of the workers concerned by about 10-15% compared to the general level around them. A second effect was the timing of the changes: when wage increases were on the agenda, unionized workers reached them earlier than non-unionized; And when the market moved in the other direction, the cuts to unionized workers were delayed for longer. When the cost of living rose rapidly, as in wartime, the ability of trade unionists to provide compensatory wage increases encouraged the expansion of the union system, particularly among employees who had previously been left out. The third effect was the ability not only to defer wage reductions in depression, but also to reduce their amount. The United States, for example, had the highest wage gap in 1932 in unionized and un syndified sectors. An important effect on the overall level of wages in terms of purchasing power and its share in the product of industry seems to be explained by opposition to wage reduction in the 1921 global economic depression: although wages were sharply reduced, often after long struggles, they could not be reduced due to falling commodity prices. , and in more than one country, the distribution of industrial product between salary and profit appears to have changed permanently. Coordination works either through sectoral or enterprise-wide agreements, which follow the directions set by high-level organizations, or through a social pact, or by identifying a leading sector (or group of companies) that sends signals to others (“standard negotiations”).